Bank balance sheets and the transmission of financial shocks to borrowers: evidence from the 2007-2008 crisis by Emilia Bonaccorsi di Patti & Enrico Sette
Temi di Discussione
(Working Papers)
Bank balance sheets and the transmission of financial shocks  
to borrowers: evidence from the 2007-2008 crisis





















Bank balance sheets and the transmission of financial shocks  
to borrowers: evidence from the 2007-2008 crisis
by Emilia Bonaccorsi di Patti and Enrico Sette
Number 848 - January 2012The purpose of the Temi di discussione series is to promote the circulation of working
papers prepared within the Bank of Italy or presented in Bank seminars by outside 
economists with the aim of stimulating comments and suggestions.
The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors and do not involve the 
responsibility of the Bank.
Editorial Board: Silvia Magri, Massimo Sbracia, Luisa Carpinelli, Emanuela Ciapanna, 
Francesco  D’Amuri, Alessandro  Notarpietro,  Pietro  Rizza,  Concetta  Rondinelli, 
Tiziano Ropele, Andrea Silvestrini, Giordano Zevi.
Editorial Assistants: Roberto Marano, Nicoletta Olivanti. 
BANK BALANCE SHEETS AND THE TRANSMISSION OF FINANCIAL SHOCKS 
TO BORROWERS: EVIDENCE FROM THE 2007-2008 CRISIS 
 
 
by Emilia Bonaccorsi di Patti




We use Italian data on bank lending to firms to study the transmission of shocks affecting bank 
balance sheets to the volume and cost of credit granted to business borrowers and to the probability of 
banks accepting loan applications from new borrowers during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The 
identification of the credit-supply effect is based on a difference-in-difference approach because: a large 
number of firms in Italy borrow from more than one bank; the shocks to the wholesale funding market 
were exogenous to Italian banks; and Italian banks were affected to a varying extent by the crisis 
depending on their funding structure. Results indicate that supply conditions worsened most for the 
banks that were most exposed to the interbank market and for those that made the most use of 
securitization. While the initial capital position of banks did not significantly affect their lending, the 
deterioration of bank capitalization as proxied by charge-offs and profitability had a significant impact. 
Furthermore, our results suggest that bank capital influenced lending indirectly, with higher capital 
reducing the elasticity of lending to the shocks on the funding side. 
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The financial crisis of 2007-08 started with a disruption of money markets, extreme volatility 
of interest rates and the drying up of the securitization market. After the French bank BNP Paribas 
froze redemptions for three investment funds in August 2007, citing its inability to value structured 
products, the spread between unsecured and secured rates on interbank loans widened up. This 
event was the starting point of a period of instability in the interbank market both in Europe and US. 
The lack of transparency in the secondary markets of asset-backed securities and uncertainty on the 
credit risk of counterparties severely impaired the ability of many banks to obtain long-term 
funding, leading to the distress of some large and interconnected intermediaries. Funding liquidity 
risk played a major role in propagating the crisis from markets to financial intermediaries 
(Brunnermeier, 2009). As the crisis unfolded after the default of Lehman, difficulties on the funding 
side interacted with adverse shocks to bank capital due to losses on bank portfolios. Indications 
from lending surveys in the US and Europe suggest that the shock to funding cost and availability 
as well as the stress on bank capitalization both contributed to a negative supply shift in credit 
markets, consistent with the theoretical literature on the bank lending channel.  
Following the crisis there has been renewed attention in understanding the role of financial 
intermediaries in the transmission of shocks from financial markets to the real economy. The 
traditional models of financial intermediation focused on imperfect substitutability between deposits 
and other funding sources for banks, or between loans and bonds for firms (e.g. Blinder, 1992, 
Bernanke and Gertler, 1995, Kashyap and Stein, 2000). Empirical evidence on the bank credit 
channel focused primarily on liquid assets holdings and bank capital as the main balance sheet 
characteristics that could affect the transmission of monetary impulses to the credit market and 
thereby to the economy. 
The recent evidence from the crisis, instead, points towards additional mechanisms related to a 
new intermediation model that prevailed among large banks before the crisis (Disyatat, 2011). First, 
disruptions of the wholesale funding market, manifest in the unwillingness to lend by participants 
due to uncertainty on the solvency of counterparties, and extreme volatility in interest rates, are 
believed to be responsible for banks’ reduced ability to extend credit. 
Second, before the crisis the development of the securitization market had diminished the 
frictions due to the imperfect substitutability between loans and other assets. Banks could issue 
                                                 
1 We thank for useful comments Giorgio Albareto, Marcello Bofondi, Nicola Cetorelli, Giorgio Gobbi, Silvia Magri, 
Joao Santos, and seminar participants at the Bank of Italy. All errors are our own. The opinions expressed do not 
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illiquid loans and transform them into liquid securities to be sold on the market. The impact of this 
change in the business model of banks is testified by the reduced effectiveness of the bank lending 
channel in the years of the securitization boom (Altunbas, Gambacorta and Marques, 2009). During 
the crisis the drying up of the securitization market reintroduced such frictions.  
A number of recent studies focusing on the default of Lehman confirm that indeed the crisis 
determined a shock to bank balance sheets on the funding side and, consequently, an adverse effect 
on lending supply. For example, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) find that syndicated lending to US 
firms dropped dramatically after Lehman’s default and the reduction in lending was negatively 
correlated with each bank’s share of retail funding. Data from the Portuguese credit register show 
that banks that relied more on interbank finance before the crisis experienced a sharper decrease in 
loan supply during the crisis than other banks (Iyer et al., 2011). 
Other analyses focusing on equity capital as the major constraint to bank lending, particularly 
after Lehman, find mixed evidence. Based on information on loan rejection rates over the current 
financial crisis, Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2011) find that German saving banks affiliated with 
Landesbanken heavily exposed to subprime lending reduced acceptance rates by more than other 
saving banks. Gambacorta and Marques (2011) find a limited effect of equity capital, while they 
find that a stronger reliance on wholesale funding and on securitizations had a substantial impact on 
credit growth in bank-level cross-country regressions on a sample of European banks. Santos (2011) 
studies loan pricing following the subprime crisis and shows that banks that incurred larger losses 
on their loans increased spreads more. Interestingly, he does not find any significant effect of bank 
capital on spreads. 
A few studies analyzed Italian data from the crisis. Using a smaller dataset than ours, 
including only firms with more than 50 employees, Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010) analyze the six 
month period after Lehman collapsed (September 2008-March 2009) to explore the relevance of 
evergreening by banks and the role of bank capital. They find a negative effect on the growth of 
loans to risky borrowers for larger less-capitalized banks but no effect for smaller less-capitalized 
banks, which suggests that other determinants could be playing a role. Two major differences with 
respect to their analysis are the following. First, they use unconsolidated data while we use group-
level data; second, they consider capital as the main transmission channel of the crisis instead of a 
wider set of bank variables. Foglia et al. (2010) show that the probability that firms declared to be 
credit constrained is higher if the banks they borrow from had lower capital and liquidity ratios but 
the results are sensitive to the specification. These firms are shown to have reduced investment   7
(Gaiotti, 2011). Finally, Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2011) document that the Lehman shock had an 
impact on the interest rate charged by banks but do not consider quantities or loan applications.
2  
In this paper we study the role of bank balance sheet characteristics in transmitting the 
turbulence from financial to credit markets, specifically to loan quantities and prices. In line with 
the literature on the bank credit channel we explore the role of the capital and liquidity position of 
banks at the onset of the crisis.  We also consider the new channels arising from banks’ dependence 
on wholesale funding and the extent to which banks employed securitization before the crisis.  
For each of the two critical shocks that occurred during the crisis, the disruption of the 
interbank market during the Summer of 2007 and the default of Lehman in the Fall of 2008, we 
relate the change in lending and the cost of credit before and after the shock to bank balance sheet 
conditions prior to the shock. As a further step, we study the probability that a credit relationship is 
terminated and, employing information on loan applications, the probability that a new relationship 
is established. Loan application data have been shown to be particularly useful to identify supply 
shifts (Jiménez et al., 2010a).  
We study separately 2007 and 2008 to provide evidence on the narrative that stress on bank 
capital was relevant in 2008 but not in 2007, and that liquidity problems were the main constraint 
for banks in 2007 but played a more limited role in 2008 after the Eurosystem expanded its support 
to banks.  
A novel aspect of our analysis is that we not only assess the role of each bank balance sheet 
variable but also explore how they interacted with each other.
3 For example, in normal times banks 
can shift between asset types reducing liquid securities, such as government bonds, when credit 
demand is sustained or in response to a tightening of monetary policy conditions (Kashyap and 
Stein, 2000; Loutskina, 2010; Loutskina and Strahan, 2009). However, if banks are constrained 
because of capital, they cannot expand risky loans. This suggests that the level of capital could 
influence the elasticity of lending to liquid assets. Another possible interaction effect could be due 
to less capitalized banks facing a stronger adverse effect from the interbank shock if their 
counterparties were more concerned about their solvency. These and other interaction effects are 
discussed below. 
                                                 
2 They do not include important controls such as measures of bank profitability, and use a long time period so that 
selection problems due to the exit of firms from the sample are particularly relevant. 
3 Recent research on monetary policy transmission (Jimenez et al. (2010a)) before the crisis suggests that bank capital 
and liquidity affect how bank react to changes in monetary policy conditions. Banks with lower capital or liquidity 
ratios restrict credit supply more when monetary policy is tightened. Similarly, Jimenez et al. (2010b) show that lower 
capitalized banks grant, expand and prolong credit to riskier firms in response to lower overnight rates. Adrian and Shin 
(2011) underline the interaction between asset pricing and intermediaries’ balance sheet which makes leverage to be 
procyclical.   8
One of the main challenges of any analysis of a change in lending conditions is how to 
identify supply shifts as opposed to demand shifts. Thanks to the availability of a large data set of 
bank-firm relationships recorded in the Italian Credit Register we resort to the following strategy.
 4 
As many firms borrow from more than one bank and banks differed in terms of initial funding 
structure, liquidity and capitalization, we can use a difference-in-difference approach that yields an 
unbiased estimate of the bank-level effect on each lending relationship. Firm fixed effects control 
for variation in credit demand across firms and allow us to identify differential effects on credit 
growth and cost across banks lending to the same firms. The freeze in the interbank market in 
August 2007, and Lehman default in September 2008 were largely unexpected, at least in their size, 
and were unrelated to Italian banks’ conditions, so that they represent exogenous shocks to Italian 
banks’ balance sheet structure. This ensures that our estimates are not biased by banks changing 
lending in anticipation of the shocks to their balance sheets.   
With respect to the existing literature we provide evidence not only on the impact of the crisis 
on credit quantities but also on the cost of credit, the survival of credit relationships and the 
willingness of banks to give loans to new clients, whereas other studies focus on only on some of 
these dimensions. Furthermore, our study provides a more complete analysis of bank balance 
sheets, considering jointly wholesale funding, liquidity, capital, and securitization activity. Finally, 
we analyze interactions among capital and funding, liquidity, profitability, thus studying the way 
bank capitalization affects banks sensitivity to shocks.  
Understanding how adverse financial impulses are transmitted through the banking system in 
periods of stress is of utmost importance for policy makers because it contributes to assess which 
policy responses could be most effective in sustaining credit flows, e.g. injecting liquidity, as 
opposed to recapitalize banks, or if both actions need to be taken together. Our analysis is also 
relevant in light of the new Basel framework for liquidity and the proposals to limit the reliance of 
banks on wholesale funding. 
Our results indicate that the structure of banks’ balance sheets before the shocks affected 
both subsequent loan growth and the cost of credit and that the channels differed between 2007 and 
2008. Consistent with the narrative, in 2007 the initial exposure to interbank markets and the extent 
to which the bank securitized before the crisis were key determinants of its ability to lend, with a 
negative effect on credit and a positive one on the interest rate paid by borrowers. We show some 
evidence that the share of liquid assets before the shock acted as a buffer to the difficulties to get 
                                                 
4 This approach is employed by Khwaja and Mian (2008) to assess the impact of a liquidity shock to Pakistani banks, 
and by Iyer et al. (2011) in their study of the impact of the crisis on Portuguese banks. Similarly, Gan (2007) employed 
data from Japan to estimate the effect on lending of the shock to bank portfolios based on their exposure to the real 
estate market when the housing bubble collapsed.   
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wholesale funding in this first phase of the crisis. In 2008 the adverse effect of the interbank 
reliance remains but, as losses started to weaken the capital position of banks, profitability was an 
additional driver of subsequent lending growth. Our data also show that banks that experienced 
higher loan charge-offs raised the cost of credit more, as well as those that securitized more before 
the crisis.  In this second period we do not find any effect of the share of liquid assets held by banks 
or the reliance of banks on securitizations on credit growth.  
A novel result is that, while in neither period the initial level of the capital ratio had a 
significant effect on lending growth or the cost of credit, the level of the capital ratio changes the 
(semi-) elasticity of other relevant variables. Lending growth by better capitalized banks is less 
sensitive to shocks to funding or to profitability. 
The results on the growth of credit are robust to excluding relationships that are interrupted 
and consistent with evidence on new relationships. A greater initial exposure to the interbank 
market increases the probability that a relationship is interrupted and reduces the probability that a 
loan application is accepted in both 2007 and 2008. While securitization mattered for relationship 
survival in 2007 it did not in 2008. Instead, profitability raised the probability that a loan 
application is accepted and reduced the probability that a relationship is terminated in 2008.    
Our findings emphasize the need for a comprehensive approach when designing policies 
aimed at increasing the resilience of banks and mitigating fluctuations in credit flows.  First, the 
structure of bank funding plays a critical role in the transmission of shocks and should be monitored 
together with the liquidity position of banks. Second, when most banks have a substantial capital 
buffer above regulatory limits, as in the case of Italy at the onset of the crisis, capital ratios have 
mostly an indirect effect on credit supply because they affect the sensitivity of banks to funding 
shocks. Countercyclical capital buffers can contribute to provide headline for lending when banks 
face shocks to other funding sources.  
 
2. Italian banks and the 2007-08 Financial Crisis 
The crisis originated in financial markets and was later transmitted to the real sector, leading 
to the most severe recession after World War II. Its origin can be traced back to developments in the 
US economy, where growing imbalances were accumulating in the private sector and government 
financial positions, in an environment of persistently low interest rates. 
While in some European countries there were similar imbalances with banks expanding in an 
unprecedented way their leverage in conjunction with housing and asset prices bubbles, in Italy a   10
more traditional intermediation model and more prudent supervision prevented the accumulation of 
excessive risks in the financial sector.  
The direct exposure of Italian banks to toxic assets and US subprime loans was negligible. 
Asset-backed securities and other structured products held by Italian banks amounted to about 32 
billion Euros at the end 2007, 23 billion at the end 2008, less than 1 per cent of total assets.  Still, 
when the crisis erupted, Italian intermediaries suffered from losses on stock market values and other 
securities held in their portfolios.  
Italian banks were affected primarily through the wholesale funding market. Figure 1 shows 
the dynamics of the Euro area interbank spread between the Euribor and Eurepo, documenting the 
sharp increase in the spread on unsecured interbank transactions. The illiquidity of the interbank 
market, together with the drying-up of the securitizations market produced a large negative shock to 
bank funding conditions. Some evidence suggests that banks partly compensated the reduced 
availability of funds from these sources by placing bonds with retail customers and moving to 
bilateral interbank transactions.
5   
As the crisis turned into a global recession at the end of 2008, also the Italian economy started 
to contract. As shown in Figure 2, defaulting loans as a proportion of existing loans started to 
increase adding further stress to bank balance sheets. The impact of losses on bank capital was 
initially limited but as firms’ balance sheets started to reflect the effects of the recession banks 
anticipated further deterioration in the loan portfolio. Furthermore, market participants reassessed 
risks and banks started to anticipate future higher capital requirements from markets and regulators. 
Given the difficulties of raising equity due to market conditions, capital constraints could have 
interacted with funding difficulties, possibly exacerbating the transmission of the financial shock to 
the real economy.      
The impact of the crisis on credit growth is depicted in Figure 3. The slowdown in credit 
expansion started in the second half of 2007. Following the default of Lehman the rate of growth of 
loans to nonfinancial firms dropped and became negative by the end of 2009.  
Evidence from the responses of the Italian banks participating to the Euro Area Bank Lending 
Survey conducted on a quarterly basis suggests that both supply and demand contributed to credit 
dynamics. According to the banks, difficulties in accessing liquidity markets first, and capital 
constraints after, contributed to a tightening of credit supply conditions (Bank of Italy, 2010; Del 
Giovane, Eramo and Nobili, 2010; Panetta and Signoretti, 2010). The survey data suggest also that 
banks reduced their risk tolerance.  
                                                 
5 See the Bank of Italy Annual Report for the years 2007 and 2008.   11
This evidence is corroborated by the behavior of the stocks of loans to non financial firms, 
measured in terms of commitments and in terms of credit drawn (disbursed).  Figure 4 reports both 
variables and shows that commitments tend to lead credit disbursed, as expected. In the short term 
firms drawdown credit that is available on their lines more intensively since they expect that credit 
commitments starts to be reduced. Figure 3 also shows credit growth broken down by bank size, 
following the Bank of Italy classification of banking entities based on assets, on a consolidated 
basis.  There are four classes: 1) top five groups, 2) other large banks or groups, 3) small banks, 4) 
local cooperative banks. The local cooperative banks are mutual banks and operate on a regional or 
sub-regional level because of legal constraints. The top five largest groups had a share of total 
industry asset of 52 per cent at the end of 2008. They own foreign subsidiaries and are active in 
major international markets. The other commercial banks largely follow a traditional intermediation 
model catering the domestic market.  
The figure shows an interesting pattern. Loan growth started to slow down in the first quarter 
of 2007 for the major banking groups, after many years of robust expansion. In the fourth quarter of 
2007 credit growth decelerated further for the top five groups while it continue to accelerate for the 
other banks, particularly the small groups. 
One obvious candidate for explaining this pattern is the different funding structure of the 
banks. The five largest banking groups have a higher share of assets that are funded by wholesale 
sources. The share of assets funded by retail deposits is much higher for the other banks and retail 
funding markets were unaffected by the crisis. This hypothesis is consistent with subsequent 
dynamics. The decline in lending continued in the second half of 2008, turning into a contraction 
for the largest five banking group. Lending growth, instead, continued for the small banks, although 
at a declining rate. A purely demand side shock would not explain this pattern unless borrowers 
were affected by the crisis with different intensity and such intensity were correlated with their 
sorting across banks. This explanation would also be inconsistent with the evidence based on 
microeconomic data that the borrowers of large banks tended to open new credit relationships with 
small banks to compensate for reduced credit availability (see the Annual Report of the Bank of 
Italy on 2009).  
As bank balance sheets weakened, other constraints might have played a role, particularly 
bank capital. The Euro Area Bank Lending Survey shows that Italian banks tightened credit supply 
conditions starting in the third quarter of 2008 (Figure 5). The answers to the survey suggest that 
participating banks perceived to be more capital constrained (see Bank of Italy Economic Bulletin). 
Contrary to intermediaries in other countries Italian banks did not experience large losses on 
Lehman-related assets; however, after the default of Lehman they started to expect a deterioration   12
of the loan portfolio because of the recession. Mean capital ratios for different bank types are 
reported in Figure 6. The largest banking groups held substantially less capital relative to total (risk-
weighted) assets already before the crisis; the data show a slight reduction in capital ratios in 2008. 
As shown in Table 1, in 2007 the average growth rate of credit commitments was lower for 
banks that have a larger initial share of funding from the interbank market, those that securitized a 
larger share of their loans, and those that held a lower share of liquid assets. The level of the capital 
ratio does not appear to be strongly correlated with credit growth. In the 2008 data, instead, the 
contraction of credit commitments is milder if banks were more capitalized and had a smaller 
volume of write-offs.  
In what follows we present the empirical strategy to test for the relevance of the funding and 
capital channels of transmission employing bank-firm data to control for firm-level demand for 
credit. We study separately 2007 and 2008 for two reasons. First, for Italian banks, the August 2007 
shock was mostly a shock to the cost of funding and to liquidity, with limited implications for the 
capital position of banks. After the default of Lehman, instead, the crisis had a truly global impact, 
and was transmitted to the real sector producing consequences for the quality of the loan portfolios 
of banks. Second, the implementation of monetary policy by the European Central Bank changed 
significantly in the fourth quarter of 2008. In order to provide ample liquidity to the market the 
European Central Bank moved to a fixed rate tender procedure with full allotment and narrowed the 
corridor (see ECB monthly Bulletin for further details). This allowed banks to obtain all the 
liquidity they demanded at a given interest rate, which could have compensated for difficulties in 
getting funds on the market.  
3. The empirical strategy 
3.1 The baseline regression 
We compare loan growth and the change in the cost of credit across firms borrowing from 
banks with different funding structure, capital, liquidity ratio, profitability. In what follows we 
illustrate the empirical model for loan growth. The interest rate model is similar and will be briefly 
described at the end of the section.  
Loan growth is specified as a function of bank variables, relationship characteristics and firm 
fixed effects.  The equation estimated is given by: 
 
∆CREDITi,j=β1INTERBANKi+β2CAPITALi+β3LIQUIDITYi+β4SECURITIZEi+ 
β5CHARGEOFFSi+β6ROAi+β7BANKSIZEi+β8MUTUAL_BANKi+   13
ρ1SHAREi,j+ρ2DISTANCEi,j+ρ3PASTDUEi,j +ρ4LOGLOANSi,j + αj + εi,j    
   (1) 
 
The variables indexed by i measure bank characteristics while those indexed by i,j control for 
bank-firm relationship characteristics; αj  are firm fixed effects. INTERBANK and CAPITAL are 
measures of the reliance on the interbank market and the capital ratio of the bank, respectively.  The 
semi-elasticities β1 and β2 measure the effect of banks’ funding and capital position on the rate of 
growth of credit, defined as total loans committed by bank i to firm j.
6 Although there are many 
different dimensions that could capture the funding structure of banks, we focus on the ratio 
between interbank deposits and total assets to measure the importance of wholesale funding for the 
bank. Adding other variables would increase the risk of multicollinearity. 
We control for the share of liquid assets the bank has, as they could act as a buffer if the bank 
needs to expand credit (LIQUIDITY) by substituting securities with loans. In the absence of capital 
constraints, as loans are weighted more than liquid assets for regulatory capital purposes, banks can 
sell liquidity to expand credit. For the 2007 sample, we expect the coefficient of liquidity to have a 
positive sign. During the crisis banks were hoarding liquidity due to expectations of further scarcity 
and uncertainty about counterparty risk so we cannot know a priori the sign of the relationship 
between the initial position in liquid assets and credit growth in the 2008 sample. 
The variable SECURITIZE measures the extent to which the bank securitized loans before the 
crisis and controls for shock to the bank funding strategy due to the drying up of the securitization 
market.  We expect this variable to have a negative coefficient.  
We include the variable CHARGEOFF measuring the write-offs and provisions on loans the 
bank has done in the previous period as a measure of the quality of the bank’s assets. We argue that 
it is more appropriate than the stock of bad loans as it reflects better the degree of ongoing 
deterioration of the portfolio rather than the effect of past defaults. This variable is meant to capture 
the expected impact of loan quality on capital.  The current capital ratio is an important determinant 
of the ability of the bank to expand lending but banks take into account actual and expected 
deviations from their desired capital ratio when setting the growth rate of loans. The impact of the 
crisis on capital was twofold. On one side the unexpected losses on bank assets affected capital 
because of charge-offs; on the other hand, banks faced difficulties to raise new equity. Given the 
short-term constraints on raising new equity, we argue that the volume of loan loss provisions and 
write-offs should proxy for the short term evolution of the capital ratio. We expect a negative effect 
of charge-offs on loan growth. 
                                                 
6 We also run regressions including a dummy for whether the bank belongs to a banking group and for whether the bank 
(each intermediary within a group) has been involved either as target or as acquirer in an M&A and results hold.   14
We also include the return on assets (ROA) before the crisis as a measure of bank 
profitability. ROA is measured in June and profits are the flow of profits between January and June, 
while assets are measured at June, and thus represent a leading indicator of end-of-year profits 
which may accrue to capital for the part that is not distributed as dividend. Then, we expect ROA to 
have a positive effect on bank’s ability to extend credit.  
Finally, we include a dummy taking the value one if the bank is a mutual bank 
(MUTUAL_BANK), zero otherwise, since such intermediaries are subjected to special regulation 
on capital and have limitations on the geographical scope of their activity. 
The details on data sources and the construction of the variables are in Section 3 below.  
The identification of the supply effect on credit results from the following conditions. The first 
is that borrower fixed effects in the regression control for firm-level heterogeneity in demand and 
other characteristics. The second is that banks were exposed to the shock with varying degree 
depending on their initial conditions. The large banks that raised a substantial share of their funding 
on international markets before the crisis were more affected by the crisis. The local banks, largely 
funded with deposits and bonds placed with retail customers, were relatively shielded from the 
initial shock. Therefore, the regressions are run with data on firms that borrow from at least two 
banks, and the effect of shocks to bank funding and capital is estimated relying on the within-firm 
variation. The third condition is that banks did not anticipate the shocks, so that their degree of 
liquidity, the reliance on interbank funding, their capital position, were not adjusted in advance to 
better withstand the expected shocks. 
We include relationship controls in the regression as each bank may apply different conditions 
to firms with which it has a closer relationship. To capture this we include a measure of distance 
between the borrower and the bank, and the share of total credit to the firm held by the bank. We 
also control for how important as a funding source the bank is by the log of the amount of the loan 
commitment at the beginning of the period (LOGLOANSij). The variable PASTDUE is a dummy 
equal to 1 if the firm is past-due on its loans with bank i. The αi are the firm fixed effects so we do 
not include any firm-level control. 
The equation for the change in the cost of credit is very similar: 
 
∆RATEij = β1INTERBANKi + β2CAPITALi + β3LIQUIDITYi + β4SECURITIZEi 
+β5CHARGEOFFSi+β6ROAi+β7BANKSIZEi+β8MUTUAL_BANKi+ρ1SHAREij+ 
ρ2DISTANCEij + ρ3PASTDUEij  + ρ4LOGLOANSij  + ρ5RATEij +αj + εij   (2) 
The cost of credit is computed as the average interest rate paid by firms on outstanding 
balances at the end of the quarter, including commissions and fees. We focus on the cost of   15
revolving credit lines as their amount and conditions can be renegotiated at short notice by banks. 
Changes in the Euribor, that is the reference rate for loans on the Italian market, are common to all 
borrowers and are absorbed in the constant. Our estimates capture the extent to which presumably 
more constrained banks changed rates to their borrowers.  
All the variables are the same as in equation (1) with the exception of RATE, which we 
include as a measure of the initial cost of credit for firm j at bank i. The variable controls for 
differences in the initial cost of revolving credit lines across lenders. Due to the fee structure in 
place in Italy, the actual cost of a revolving credit line is affected by the way the line is used: this 
may be very large if the line is used up to its limit for just a couple of days, e.g. to pay wages or 
taxes. The initial level of the rate helps controlling for such unobserved characteristics of the credit 
relationship.   
 In all regressions we cluster standard errors at the bank level since our key bank variables 
do not vary across firms. Not clustering would severely underestimate the standard errors. In the 
following Section we describe the data and variables employed in the analysis. 
3.2   Impact on small and risky borrowers  
The baseline specification estimates the average effect for all firms. We modify the regression 
to take into account the possibility that banks changed supply conditions only to specific groups of 
borrowers. In particular, we test if smaller, riskier, more leveraged, less profitable borrowers faced 
greater constraints, as the survey evidence suggests. Other studies found that small firms tend to be 
affected more by adverse shocks to banks.  
The regression equation is modified to include interaction terms between the key bank 
variables in equation (1) and a dummy identifying the firm type under investigation: 
 
∆CREDITi,j = β(BANK VARIABLESi) + ζ(BANK VARIABLESi)*FIRMDUMMYj   
+β7BANKSIZEi+β8MUTUAL_BANKi+ρ1SHAREi,j+ρ2DISTANCEi,j+ 
ρ3PASTDUEi,j +ρ4LOGLOANSi,j + αj + εi,j 
          (3) 
The vector ζ  is the set of coefficients of the interaction terms between the bank 
characteristics and the dummy identifying either firms in the lowest quartile of the size distribution 
of firm or firms in the highest quartile of the distribution of leverage.  The same specification is 
estimated for the change in the cost of credit.   16
3.3 Interactions between bank balance sheet characteristics 
The baseline model is further modified to investigate the possibility that the effect of the 
different sources of constraint to credit supply interact with each other. For example, the ability of 
the bank to sustain lending by selling liquid assets may depend on the capital position of the bank. 
If capital is binding because the bank has faced high losses, banks may hold more liquidity than 
desired because they do not have enough capital to support more loans. Similarly, a stronger 
funding position might not be enough to increase loans if the bank faces capital constraints or if 
charge-offs are eroding its capital base. We modify the baseline model including interactions 
between liquidity, interbank exposure, securitization, loan charge-offs, and the bank capital ratio. 
  
∆CREDITi,j = β(BANK VARIABLES) + γ(BANK VARIABLES)*CAPRATIO   
+β7BANKSIZE+β8MUTUAL_BANK+ρ1SHARE+ρ2DISTANCE+ρ3PASTDUE 
+ρ4LOGLOANS + αj + εi,j 
          (4) 
The interaction term coefficients capture any variation in the impact of the bank balance 
sheet characteristics on credit growth that is dependent on the level of initial capital the bank has.  
4. The data 
4.1 Data sources and main dependent variables 
We employ a very large data set of credit relationships between Italian banks and non-
financial firms. We merge information from four sources: i) data on loans from the Central Credit 
Register (CR); ii) data on the cost of credit for a representative sample of Italian banks from a 
special section of the CR); iii) Supervisory Reports on banks’ balance sheets; iv) financial variables 
on borrowers from the Firm Register (Cerved). The CR is a centralized system managed by the 
Bank of Italy that tracks the credit exposures of the clients of resident banks. Banks can file 
inquiries to the CR about loan applicants to verify their creditworthiness, specifically regarding the 
total amount of outstanding loans and the borrower default history. To be recorded in the CR a 
borrower has to have either loan commitments or loans outstanding of at least 75,000 euros.  
At each reporting date (end of the month), banks provide information on credit committed by 
type of loan, the amount of credit actually disbursed, whether the loan is collateralized or not. The 
loan types are: i) loans backed by account-receivables, ii) term loans, iii) revolving credit lines. The 
information on interest rates is instead collected quarterly and refers to the average cost paid by the 
borrower on credit disbursed for each type of loan, with commissions and fees included.    17
To construct our data set, we start from the cross-section of all credit relationships recorded in 
the CR at the end of June 2007 and referring to businesses. If the borrower is already in default 
status with one lender we drop the relationship. If the lender belongs to a banking group we 
aggregate all the credit relationships each firm has with banks of the same group. We do this for 
three reasons: first, lending policies are typically decided at the group level; second, funding, 
especially interbank funding, is conducted at the group level, and funds are then redistributed 
through the internal capital market among member banks; third, the regulatory capital ratios are 
imposed both at the group and at the individual level. We also include loans granted by financial 
companies that are part of banking groups as many groups include specialized intermediaries that 
do factoring and leasing. We want to make sure we do not underestimate the credit provided by the 
same entity. 
We then collect the data on the same relationships as of December 2007 and compute growth 
rates for both credit committed and disbursed. To account for changes in the composition of 
banking groups or mergers and acquisitions between independent banks occurred between June and 
December 2007 we construct pro-forma data for the June 2007 relationships by applying the group 
structure as of December 2007. Loans that were securitized between June and December are 
attributed to the originating bank if the vehicle is controlled by the originator because the bank is 
still lending to the firm and still has an exposure in terms of risk. 
Growth rates are computed as percentage changes in credit commitments. In computing 
growth rates we need to take into account the cases in which credit drops to zero or the relationship 
is no longer observed at the end of the period. There are three possible reasons: i) the firm has 
defaulted and the bank no longer extends credit; ii) the relationship has been interrupted either by 
choice of the borrower or of the lender; iii) the observation is censored because of the CR threshold.  
In case i) we can observe defaulted loans in register regardless their amount. Cases ii) and iii) are 
treated in the same way since it is not possible to distinguish them. This could lead us to 
overestimate the magnitude of the reduction in credit but not whether there was or not a drop. To 
ensure the robustness of the results we estimate the regressions both keeping all the cases in which 
credit goes to zero and setting credit growth to -100 per cent (baseline), and dropping them, thus 
analyzing the intensive margin. In this case, as a further robustness check, we also estimated the 
model measuring growth rates by the difference in the log of committed credit, and results, 
available on request, are unchanged.    
The credit data were then matched with the firm variables from Cerved, described below in 
Section 4.3. Cerved collects the balance sheets of approximately 500,000 firms from the official 
Italian Firm Register. We employ the Cerved data referring to 2006 to limit endogeneity with   18
respect to credit conditions and to reflect the balance sheets that the banks could observe between 
June and December 2007. 
We repeated the procedure to construct the matched bank-firm data for credit relationships 
observed at the end of June 2008. Pro-forma relationships were obtained applying to June 2008 the 
banking group compositions observed in December 2008. The Cerved balance sheet data refer in 
this case to 2007.  
The match of Cerved with the CR yields over 700,000 relationships referring to about 300,000 
firms in each period. Many Cerved firms do not have loans in the CR and many of the firms in CR 
do not have balance sheets in Cerved, mostly because they are small and the data are incomplete. 
Since we have firm fixed effects in our main specification, the sample used for the regressions only 
includes firms that borrow from at least two banks. The resulting samples contain about 630,000 
relationships in the first phase of the crisis (2007), and about 655,000 in the second one (2008). 
In our main regression we study the behavior of total credit commitments. For robustness we 
also estimate regressions for total credit disbursed. The dynamics of the two components may differ 
significantly as in Italy the costs of unused credit commitments is typically included in up-front 
fees. While credit commitments reflect relatively more the supply-side decisions of banks, credit 
disbursed is mainly driven by firms’ decisions about how much they draw from the available 
commitments. Past observation has shown that the ratio of drawn to committed tends to increase 
when credit demand is high and then is followed by an expansion in credit commitments during 
credit booms. Symmetrically, the ratio increases when credit supply is not accommodating demand 
during a tightening of loan supply; in this case both commitments and credit drawn contract or 
slowdown with commitments leading (see also Figure 4).  
The distribution of the growth rate of credit in our sample of bank-firm relationships is shown 
in  Table 2. On average, credit commitments decreased in both periods while credit disbursed 
increased. Credit disbursed is more volatile than credit commitments, as firms use available credit 
depending on their liquidity needs. This explains why mean growth is positive. However, median 
growth is negative in both periods for both committed and disbursed indicating that credit disbursed 
did decrease for most relations. 
In the empirical analysis of the cost of credit we employed data on the interest rates charged 
by banks to firms on credit drawn from revolving credit lines, comprehensive of fees and 
commissions. The cost is the annualized rate charged in the quarter of reference on loans disbursed. 
In our analysis we compare the change in the cost of credit between the second and fourth quarters 
of 2007 and 2008, respectively. We focus on revolving credit lines as their conditions can be   19
renegotiated at short notice by the bank. We expect that changes in the cost of funding are 
transmitted to the cost of credit lines more quickly than to other forms of credit. 
These data are available for a representative sample of the banking system (about 90 per cent 
of business loans outstanding in Italy) so we lose some of the observations due to missing 
information on rates. 
The distribution of interest rates is shown in Table 2. In 2007, median rates increased by 44 
basis points, although the mean was slightly negative (17 basis points). In 2008, the median was 
again positive, 28 basis points, while the mean was almost zero (8 basis points). These are in line 
with expectations: policy rates in 2008 decreased substantially after Lehman default, and this may 
explain the lower median value for rates in 2008 than in 2007, despite the stronger increase in the 
rates on unsecured interbank deposits. 
4.2 Bank variables 
Bank variables are constructed from data in the Supervisory Reports filed with the Bank of 
Italy. In what follows we employ the term bank and use consolidated data when the individual bank 
belongs to a group, unconsolidated if that bank does not belong to a group. We exclude subsidiaries 
of foreign banks from the sample, since we do not observe the data for the parent company.
7  
The variable INTERBANK is the ratio of total borrowing from other banks to total assets.  
LIQUIDITY is the sum of cash holdings and sovereign bonds divided by total assets.
8 Both 
variables are averages of the data for the previous three semesters (June 2006, December 2006 and 
June 2007; June 2007, December 2007, and June 2008). We take averages to smooth temporary 
fluctuations in banks’ liquidity needs because we want to capture the structural liquidity ratio.  
 The capital ratio (CAPRATIO) is given by the standard ratio of regulatory capital to total 
risk weighted assets. As discussed in Section 2, we need to control for the quality of assets in 
addition to having a measure of the current capital ratio to capture the bank’s ability to expand 
lending. Ideally we would need a forward looking measure of loan defaults, for example provisions, 
to measure the bank’s expectations about portfolio quality. However, such measure is not available 
and we can use only the aggregate of provisions and charge-offs. We construct the ratio of loan loss 
provisions and charge-offs to t-1 loans (CHARGEOFF). The data refer to the semester that precedes 
the one under study so CHARGEOFF contains provisions for the expected losses in the upcoming 
                                                 
7 We also exclude a small government owned bank specialized in credit to sport activities that has a very large capital 
ratio (above 90%). The bank has only 125 relationships in our dataset, so results are not affected by its exclusion. 
8 We also estimated the model using the ratio of cash plus securities (including shares, corporate bonds, etc.) to total 
assets as the measure of liquidity and results were broadly unchanged. We believe that cash and sovereign bonds as 
liquid assets better captures the actual liquidity position of banks as securities such as shares and corporate bonds traded 
at a significant discount as the crisis unfolded.   20
semester and charge-offs from the previous one. Other studies do not account for this dimension, 
which we believe can be particularly important when it is very costly to raise new equity on the 
market. The variable ROA is given by the ratio of profits (or losses) to total assets, computed at the 
beginning of each period (June 2007 or June 2008). Profitability in the first half of the year  is a 
leading indicator of end of year profits which can be retained to increase bank capital. The variable 
SECURITIZE is a measure of the reliance of the bank on securitization as a means to mobilize its 
portfolio before the crisis. We compute the annual volume of securitized loans in the years 2004-
2006 and cumulate it. The sum is normalized by bank total assets as of June 2007.
9 Bank size is 
measured by the log of gross total assets.  
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of the bank variables. The intermediaries in our sample 
are highly heterogeneous in terms of size, capitalization, reliance on the interbank market for 
funding, volume of securitization. The comparison between the first and the second phase of the 
crisis shows that in the latter, capitalization and the reliance on the interbank market was lower, 
while charge-offs were higher. Most banks did not securitize any loan between 2004 and 2006 but 
the relatively large value of the standard deviation reflects the fact that few banks engaged in 
substantial securitization. Table 4 shows the correlation matrix of the bank-level variables. The 
correlations among the bank variables employed in the regressions mostly capture the difference in 
business model between the larger banks and the small retail oriented ones. 
4.3 Relationship and Firm Controls 
In all regressions we include relationship-specific controls for the willingness of the bank to 
extend further credit to the borrower.  The log volume of credit committed at the beginning of each 
sample period (LOGLOANS) and the share of bank i in total credit to firm j (SHARE) measure the 
exposure of the bank to each firm and how important the lender is with respect to all funding 
sources to the firm. The signs of the coefficients are ambiguous. If a bank already has a high 
exposure to the firm, it may be less willing to increase it further; however, if the firm is financially 
fragile and dependent on the bank, there could be an incentive to keep lending further in the hope 
that cyclical economic conditions improve. The strength of the relationship is measured by a 
dummy taking the value zero if bank i has a branch in the same zip code in which the firm has its 
head office (DISTANCE). Banks that are physically close to the firm or provide loans based on a 
stronger relationship with the firm are expected to have incentives to smooth credit in difficult times 
to that firm, ceteris paribus. If the firm has already loans that are past due with the bank, the bank 
will be less likely to grant additional credit. Therefore, we include a dummy variable taking the 
                                                 
9 For the 2008 sample we also tried normalizing the variable by June 2008 assets, and results are unchanged.    21
value one if firm j had past due loans with bank i (PASTDUE) at the beginning of each sample 
period (June 2007, June 2008). 
For the purpose of analyzing differential effects of the bank funding shocks on different types 
of borrowers, we focus on size or risk. We identify small firms as those in the bottom quartile of the 
distribution of sales. Riskier borrowers are identified according to three alternative definitions: i) 
those whose leverage, computed as total debt divided by total assets
10, is in the top quartile of the 
distribution; ii) those classified in the top 3 notches of Altman’s Z-score as computed and released 
by Cerved
11 (Altman et al. 1994); iii) those with operating profits in the bottom quartile of the 
distribution. The main descriptive statistics of the firms included in the sample are shown in Table 
5. 
Table 6 reports sample statistics. The bank variables have a very different distribution than in 
the bank-level raw data because the sample is dominated by the large banks that lend to many 
borrowers.
12  
5. Results from the baseline regression and heterogeneous borrower effects 
5.1 June-December 2007 
Column 1 in Table 7 shows results from the estimation of the baseline model. The main 
variables have the expected sign. The exposure of the bank to the interbank market is negative and 
significant and the measure of liquidity is positive and significant. Based on the estimated 
coefficients, a one standard deviation increase in the exposure to the interbank market led to a lower 
growth of credit commitments by 0.86 percentage points. A bank whose share of liquid assets over 
total assets was higher by one standard deviation increased its credit commitments by 0.56 
percentage points. Both are economically significant effects as the mean growth of commitments in 
our sample is -3.8 percent. 
Coefficients on the capital ratio, loan write-offs, and return on assets are not statistically 
significant. This is in line with the idea that the August 2007 shock had a limited impact on bank 
capital, and is consistent with findings in other studies (Iyer et al., 2011).  
Regarding the other bank level controls, the extent to which banks securitized their loans 
prior to the crisis has a negative and highly significant coefficient. A one standard deviation 
increase in the ratio of amount of loans securitized to total assets led to a -1.5 percentage point 
                                                 
10 For a large number of smaller borrowers no data are available on financial debt. Leverage is computed as 1-
(equity/assets). 
11 Cerved uses a scale of 9 scores with credit risk increasing from low to high values. 
12 For robustness purposes we repeat the estimation without the two largest banks, and results, available upon request 
hold. 
   22
lower growth in credit commitments. As argued above, this variable measures both the extent to 
which the bank accessed another source of funding that was important before the crisis, and the 
business model of the bank. Overall these results point to the importance of the funding structure 
for credit growth and no direct effect of the capital position of the bank.  
The coefficients of the relationship controls have the expected sign. The growth of credit 
commitments is larger in relationships with banks that are geographically closer. If the borrower 
had already past-due loans with the banks credit grows less, as expected.  
In Column 2 of Table 7 we report the results of a robustness check in which the dependent 
variable is the growth rate of committed revolving credit lines. These lines are mostly unsecured 
and can be terminated at short notice by the parties. The securitization variable remains statistically 
significant and negative while the coefficients of the exposure to the interbank market and liquidity 
both have the expected sign but are no longer significant. The coefficient of loan charge-offs is 
statistically significant and positive. This result however is not robust since it is entirely driven by 
one of the largest banks, which accounts for thousands of the relationships in our sample. If 
estimates are run excluding this very large intermediary, the coefficient of loan charge-offs is 
insignificant. This result could be explored in further analyses. 
Finally, column 3 shows estimates of a regression of credit disbursed instead of credit 
committed. Results indicate that firms draw credit less from banks that have a higher ratio of 
securitized to total assets. The usage of credit lines is employed by banks to monitor borrowers 
health: internal monitoring procedures of banks often require loan officers to explore the reasons for 
a more intense usage of the lines. This piece of information is typically used when banks decide to 
renegotiate credit lines. Our results are consistent with this possibility: firms may want to reveal less 
information about their financial health to banks that were more exposed to the crisis, possibly 
fearing that such banks could be more inclined to cut credit if borrowers show signs of fragility. 
We study this possibility in further detail, and in particular, we examine whether the 
elasticity of credit to banks’ balance sheet variables, and thus to their exposure to the shock, differs 
as a function of firm characteristics. Table 8 reports regressions that include interaction terms 
between the bank variables and dummies that identify the riskier or smaller firms. None of the 
interaction terms is statistically significant, indicating little evidence of heterogeneous elasticity of 
credit to banks’ balance sheet variables across firms. The linear term for capital is negative and 
marginally significant in the regressions with interactions for riskier and low profitability firms. 
This may be due to banks with less capital granting relatively more credit to safer and more 
profitable firms.   23
We then turn to the transmission of the shock to interest rates charged on revolving credit 
lines. Table 9 shows the results. In column 1 we report coefficient estimates for the baseline 
regression for the cost of credit, inclusive of fees and commissions. The higher the reliance of the 
bank on the interbank market and on securitizations prior to the crisis the greater the relative 
increase in rates. The cost of credit lines from banks with a one standard deviation higher share of 
interbank funding to total assets increased by 17 basis points more, that from banks with the same 
increase in securitizations over total assets prior to the crisis increased by 52 basis points more. 
These findings reflect the fact that these banks were those that faced the largest increase in the cost 
of funds.  The initial level of the cost of credit is negatively related to its change during the shock.
13 
This is expected as banks are less likely to increase rates much if these were already higher. 
Columns 2 to 5 of Table 9 investigate whether firm size or risk mattered in how bank 
variables affected the cost of credit. Again, there is little evidence of differences in the elasticity of 
the cost of credit to bank balance sheet structure across firms. Only the interaction between 
interbank funding and the dummy for riskier firms is marginally significant. Its negative sign 
indicates that the elasticity of the interest rate to bank’s reliance on interbank funding is smaller if 
the borrower is riskier. This may seem counterintuitive, but it can be rationalized by the fact that the 
pricing of credit to riskier borrowers is mostly affected by firm-specific characteristics than by bank 
characteristics, at least as long as the real sector is not hit by a system-wide shock. Interestingly, 
loan charge-offs still have a positive but now significant (at the 10 percent level) coefficient, 
indicating that banks with more credit write-offs increase the cost of credit more. This result is in 
line with Santos (2011). 
5.2 June-December 2008 
We now turn to study the second period, in which changes of loan commitments are 
measured between June and December 2008. We expect the variables that have an impact on future 
capital (bank profitability and loan charge-offs) to matter more than in the previous periods. Results 
from the estimation of the baseline regression are shown in Column 1 of Table 10. Among the bank 
variables, both the reliance on interbank funding prior to the crisis and return on assets have a 
significant effect on credit growth. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in the extent to 
which banks raise funds in the interbank market leads to a 0.71 percentage points lower credit 
growth, while a one standard deviation increase in bank ROA leads to a 2.55 percentage points 
higher credit growth. These are economically significant effects when compared to a mean credit 
                                                 
13 The initial level of outstanding revolving credit lines is defined before the change in the cost of credit during the 
crisis.   24
growth of -4.63 percent in the sample. The other variables, in particular liquidity, have the expected 
sign, but none is significant. This may be due to the effect of the unprecedented monetary policy 
interventions put in place by the ECB easing liquidity concerns of banks.  
Column 2 shows results from the baseline model regressed on the growth rate of revolving 
credit lines. Now, only loan charge-offs is significant, and negative, indicating that banks with 
greater portfolio deterioration contracted credit more. Loan charge-offs also capture bank’s appetite 
for risk, and we can expect that, in the presence of a system-wide recession, banks with more loan 
charge-offs tend to reduce their supply of unsecured credit lines. Column 3 shows results for the 
growth rate of credit drawn: firms use credit more from banks with higher ROA. This, as in the 
2007 sample, supports the idea that firms use more intensely the credit lines granted by healthier 
banks. 
Table 11 shows the results of regressions with the interaction terms for small and riskier 
firms. None of the interactions is significant, indicating again little heterogeneity in the elasticity of 
credit to bank balance sheet structure for different borrowers. Finally, we analyze the pass-through 
of the shock to interest rates. Table 12 (column 1) reports the estimated coefficients for the baseline 
regression for the cost of credit. The reliance on securitizations before the crisis, and loan charge-
offs have a positive and significant effect. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in either 
variable leads to a 0.36 and 0.86 basis point higher cost of credit, respectively. Column 2 to 5 show 
regressions with heterogeneous effects of the bank variables across firms. Banks with more capital 
increased the cost of credit less to riskier and smaller firms. There is a difference in the effect of 
liquidity and of interbank funding between smaller and larger firms. However, the total effect of 
liquidity, capital ratio, interbank funding, is not significant on either class of firms. Similarly, the 
effect of interbank funding for riskier firms is not significant. These results again suggest that there 
has been little heterogeneity in the elasticity of interest rates to bank balance sheet structure. 
Overall, these results suggest that in the 2007 sample, bank liquidity, exposure to the 
interbank market and securitization activity were particularly important in shaping the dynamic of 
credit supply both in terms of quantity and cost.  After the default of Lehman, bank profitability has 
a strong influence on the growth of credit commitments and we interpret this as indicating that 
banks were paying greater attention to the evolution of capital ratios. This interpretation is 
consistent with a strong positive and significant effect of loan charge offs on the cost of credit. 
6. Results on interactions between bank balance sheet variables  
In this section we study whether bank balance sheet variables have non linear effects on 
credit supply. We focus our attention mostly on the capital ratio, whose role has been stressed by   25
the theoretical literature on the bank lending channel. Estimates from regressions on credit quantity 
for the June-December 2007 data are shown in Table 13. Results uncover an interesting pattern: 
securitizations and ROA matter less the more capitalized is the bank. In particular, in the first phase 
of the crisis, a one standard deviation drop in the capital ratio from the mean (this essentially 
represents a depletion of excess capital since the capital ratio drops to around 8 percent
14), raises the 
semi-elasticity of the growth of credit commitments to ROA by about 80 basis points (from 5.4 to 
6.2 per cent), and lowers that to securitizations by about 25 basis point (from -1.5 to -1.25 per cent). 
The total effect of capital is not significant at the average level of liquidity, interbank funding, 
reliance on securitizations.  
Our results also suggest that there is a positive and significant interaction between the shares 
of liquid assets and of interbank funding, indicating that banks are more sensitive to their liquidity 
position if they rely more on interbank funding, and similarly, the negative effect of interbank 
funding on credit growth is mitigated by banks’ liquidity. This is what we would expect if liquid 
assets are employed as a buffer to compensate adverse shocks to funding availability. 
Table 14 shows results from the same regressions estimated on the 2008 data. As in the 2007 
sample, the capital position of the bank increases its sensitivity to the impact of the shock, although 
the relevant channels are somewhat different: a one standard deviation drop in capital ratio, raises 
(in absolute value) the semi-elasticity of the growth of credit commitments to securitizations by 
about 36 basis points; those to bad loan provisions and to ROA by about 32 basis points. This is 
consistent with the expectation that banks that already absorbed more losses on their loan portfolio 
or were less profitable, took a more prudent stance towards borrowers the less their initial capital 
position.  
The same regressions were estimated for the change in the interest rate as the dependent 
variable. In the 2007 sample none of the interactions is significant. In the 2008 sample only those 
between capital and liquidity, capital and securitizations, interbank funding and liquidity are 
significant, indicating that the effect of liquidity in dampening interest rate increases is stronger the 
more the bank is capitalized, the effect of the exposure to the interbank market in passing through 
interest rate raises is weaker the more the bank has liquid assets, and finally the effect of the 
reliance on securitizations is weaker the more the bank is capitalized (results are not reported for the 
sake of brevity, but are available upon request). 
                                                 
14 We use the distribution of bank variables from the bank-firm relations sample. See Table 6.   26
7. Relationship survival and new relationships 
The analysis discussed so far focuses on the dynamics of credit volume and cost for 
relationships that were already observed at the beginning of each period and treats equally a 
reduction in credit and the interruption of the relationship. As a next step, we study the dynamics of 
relationships distinguishing between those that still exist at the end of each period and those that are 
no longer observed. 
  Column 1 of Table 15 shows results from the baseline regression estimated on the 
subsample of relationships in place both at June 2007 and at December 2007. The results are very 
similar to those for the entire sample. Banks with more liquidity, with less exposure to the interbank 
market, and that securitized their loans less prior to the crisis, increased credit granted more. Now, 
also ROA is significant and positive, indicating that more profitable banks increased credit 
commitments more. 
In Column 2 we show the estimated coefficients for the probability that a relationship in 
place at June 2007 no longer exists by the end of the year. We define a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
a credit relationship in place at June 2007 is no longer observed at December 2007
15. About 8 per 
cent of the relationships in our sample are cut.
16 The model is estimated as a linear probability 
model to avoid estimating a Probit with a very large number of fixed effects. The probability that a 
relationship is terminated is larger if banks rely more on the interbank market and if they securitize 
assets more prior to the crisis. As expected, the probability a relationship is cut is higher if the firm 
is geographically more distant from the borrower. 
The results for the 2008 data are shown in columns 4 and 5 of Table 15. The frequency of 
relationships interrupted in this sample is 6.2 per cent. Column 4 displays estimates from 
relationships that are in place in both June and December 2008. Both liquidity and ROA are 
positive and significant, while interbank funding is negative and marginally not significant (p-value 
0.116). These results are similar to those for the entire sample.  Moreover, as reported in column 5, 
the probability a relationship is cut increases in the bank reliance on interbank funding and if banks 
have a lower ROA. Overall, these results point to a somewhat weaker, though still significant, effect 
of interbank funding and the liquidity position, and a more important role for bank profitability in 
the 2008 than in the 2007 period. 
Finally, we consider the extensive margin, i.e. the decision of a bank to grant loans to new 
clients. Banks might allocate credit preferably to existing borrowers when they are constrained and 
                                                 
15 There is the possibility that the relationship is no longer observed because it falls below the CR reporting threshold. 
In this case we are overestimating relationship severed by treating relationships that experience a cut in credit as going 
to zero.  
16 The sample size drops because we use in the estimation only firms that have multiple relationships. If a firm has two 
relationships, and one of these is cut, we exclude the firm from the estimation, as it becomes a single-banked firm.   27
be more reluctant to lend to new borrowers. We use data on loan applications recorded in the Credit 
Register to study the probability that a loan application is accepted.  The CR records requests of 
information by banks on a given borrower and keeps track of the motivation of the request, 
typically a loan application by a new client. Therefore, we indirectly have data on the number of 
applications by each borrower to each bank within a given period. We count all the queries 
submitted by banks between June 2007 and December 2007 and between June 2008 and December 
2008. Then, we check in the Credit Register if the bank granted any credit to the loan applicant in 
the sample period and in the following three months. For example, we consider a loan application 
submitted to a bank between June 2007 and December 2007 as accepted if we observe that the bank 
grants credit to the borrower between June 2007 and the end of March 2008.  
We then estimate regressions with the same set of explanatory variables and a binary 
dependent variable defined as equal to 1 if the application of firm j to bank i is accepted, 0 
otherwise. The frequencies of accepted applications are 39.6 per cent in 2007 and 25.7 in 2008. 
Again, the regression is estimated as a linear probability model with firm fixed effects using firms 
that posted at least two loan applications. We prefer to use the linear probability model because 
there are many possible unobservables at the firm level that we cannot control for. Including the 
firm fixed effects reduces by more than half the sample as it requires at least two applications by 
each firm in the same period. We repeated the estimation without the firm fixed effects over the 
whole sample of firm applying for loans and results are qualitatively the same. 
Results for 2007 are reported in column 3 of Table 15.  We find that banks with a lower 
exposure to the interbank market are more likely to accept loan applications, as expected: a one 
standard deviation increase in interbank funding over total assets decreases the probability a loan 
application is accepted by about 1.8 percent. 
Results for 2008 are shown in column 6 of Table 15. They indicate that banks with more 
liquid assets and with higher ROA are more likely to accept loan applications as in the 2007 sample. 
A one standard deviation increase in the share of liquid to total assets raises the probability a loan 
application is accepted by about 1.7 per cent, the same increase in ROA raises the probability by 
about 1 percent. 
The study of the probability of initiating new credit relationships confirms the overall 
picture: bank profitability plays a more prominent role after Lehman, with the unfolding of the 
global recession and expectations of higher capital requirements, than in the 2007 sample. On the 
other hand, liquidity still plays a role, while banks’ reliance on interbank funding seems to be 
somewhat less important.    28
8. Conclusions 
The evidence from the empirical analysis supports the view that initial banks’ balance sheet 
structure mattered for loan growth once the banks were hit by the crisis. Overall, we find some 
evidence that the frictions that mattered were different in 2008 from 2007. In 2007 the exposure to 
interbank markets, the use of securitizations before the crisis, and the share of liquid assets had 
significant effects on credit growth. In 2008 the data support a strong effect of bank profitability 
and loan charge-offs (the latter mainly on the cost of credit), given the initial level of capitalization, 
which suggests that concerns for the evolution of capital were playing a role.  
As in other studies, we do not find any significant effect of the level of the capital ratio on 
lending growth. However, we do find evidence suggesting that the initial capital position affected 
the elasticity of credit growth to the other balance sheet variables. The effect of the funding 
structure on credit supply critically depends on the degree of banks’ capitalization, as suggested by 
models of the bank credit channel (Kashyap and Stein, 1993). While capital ratios in our data have 
little “direct” effect on credit growth at the average of the sample, they significantly impact on the 
(semi-) elasticity of the funding variables: better capitalized banks are less sensitive to shocks to 
funding.  
Finally, our analysis of changes in the cost of credit indicates that banks that relied more on 
securitizations and on the interbank markets prior to the crisis, and that had higher loan charge-offs, 
increased interest rates on revolving credit lines more than the other banks, thereby transmitting to 
customers a higher fraction of the increase in the aggregate cost of funding caused by the crisis. 
Overall, the policy message arising from our results is that the funding structure of banks 
and liquidity are very important in shaping the bank lending channel during a crisis. A robust result 
that could be further explored is that banks’ reliance on securitization represented a source of 
weakness to the shock. Macroprudential and monetary policy models should therefore include the 
funding structure of banks and their business models in evaluating the response of credit volumes 
and standards to shocks.    29
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Figure 5: Net Percentage of Italian Banks that tightened credit supply conditions 
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Table 1: Bank Credit growth conditional on the distribution of bank characteristics  
 
  June-December 2007  June-December 2008 
  Growth of credit commitments 
  <25 pct  25-75 pct  >75 pct  <25 pct  25-75 pct  >75 pct 
Capital ratio  -5.7  -4.9 -5.5  -6.9  -5.9 -3.4 
Liquid Assets/Assets  -5.9  -5.0 -5.1  -6.9  -5.9 -2.7 
Interbank borrowing/Assets  -5.4  -4.8 -6.0  -2.9  -6.0 -8.0 
Securitizations/Assets  -4.8  -5.2 -5.9  -4.4  -5.7 -7.2 
Charge-offs/loans  -5.7  -4.9 -5.3  -3.9  -6.1 -6.6 






Table 2: Descriptive statistics of credit growth and interest rate changes. 
 2007  2008 
  Mean Median  Std.dev  Mean Median  Std.dev 
Dependent Variables 
ΔCREDIT   Growth rate of credit 
commitments 
(percentage points) 
-3.8 0  43.1 -4.63  0  37.5 
ΔDISB   Growth rate of credit 
disbursed (percentage 
points) 
17.1 -3.05 116.7  14.43  -4.24 108.5 
ΔRATE  Change in the cost of 
credit for revolving 
credit lines (percentage 
points) 
-0.17 0.44  8.28  0.08  0.28  7.57 
   35
 
Table 3: Statistics on Banks 
Variable name  Definition  June 2007  June 2008 
    Mean Median  Std.dev  Mean Median  Std.dev 
INTERBANK  Interbank borrowing 
divided by total assets 
3.73 1.34 9.18  3.8  1.3  9.8 
CAPRATIO  Regulatory capital 
divided by risk 
weighted assets 
17.3 14.6 8.41 17.4 14.5  9.9 
LIQUIDITY  Cash and Sovereign 
bonds divided by Total 
Assets 
16.2 14.2 9.90 15.4 13.9  9.8 
SECURITIZE  Cumulated 
securitizations 2004-
2006 divided by Total 
Assets 
1.52 0 5.82  1.5  0 5.81 
CHARGEOFF  Loan Loss Provisions 
and Charge-offs 
divided by the t-1 stock 
of loans 
0.29 0.12  2.5  0.24 0.16 0.42 
ROA  Profits divided by total 
assets 
0.43 0.48 0.64 0.25 0.37 0.82 
SIZE  Total Assets (million 
Euros) 
5,301 293  50,359  5,563 323  53,012 
          
N. of banks     538    537    
of which mutual    387    381    
          


















Table 4: Correlation matrix of Bank Variables 
  CAPRAT. LIQUID.  INTERB. SECURIT. CH-OFF  ROA  BS  MUT.B.   
CAPRATIO  1            
LIQUIDITY  0.60        1          
INTERBANK  -0.32  -0.28  1         
SECURITIZE  -0.16  -0.22  0.13  1        
CHARGEOFF  -0.17  -0.17  0.33  0.26  1       
ROA  0.06 0.09 0.17 -0.46  -0.15  1       
BANKSIZE  -0.49 -0.44 0.51 -0.12 0.23 0.53  1     
MUTUAL B.  0.53  0.62 -0.36 -0.03 -0.19 -0.09 -0.61  1   
  
  CAPRAT. LIQUID.  INTERB.  SECURIT. CH-OFF  ROA  BS  MUT.B.   
CAPRATIO  1            
LIQUIDITY  0.52  1          
INTERBANK  -0.29  -0.03  1         
SECURITIZE  -0.11  -0.19  0.20  1        
CHARGEOFF  0.01  -0.15  0.03  0.26  1       
ROA  0.06 0.22 0.01 -0.59  -0.12  1       
BANKSIZE  -0.52 -0.37 0.58 -0.12 0.23 0.14  1     
MUTUAL B.  0.50  0.56 -0.31 -0.03 -0.19 0.07 -0.61  1     37
Table 5: Firms in the Sample, descriptive statistics 
All variables except for leverage are in thousands of Euros. Leverage is defined as (1-equity)/total assets. 
 
Variable name  2006  2007 
  Mean Median Std.dev Mean Median Std.dev 
SALES  6,301 1058  130,895  6,475  1,080  126,933 
ASSETS  5,877 981  182,198  6,073  1,003  193,654 
OPERATING 
PROFITS 
453 70  22,564  482  73  23459 
INVESTMENT  1,185 67  148,359  816 76 17255 
LEVERAGE  0.79  0.86 0.20  0.79  0.86 0.20 
N. OF LENDERS  2.6  2 2.5  2.6  2 2.4 
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Table 6: Sample statistics  
The statistics refer to the sample of bank-firm relationship data employed in the estimation. All variables 
with the exception of the growth rates are measured as of June of each year. Dependent variables measure 
the change in the given variable between June and December of each year.  
 
Bank Characteristics 
    June 2007  June 2008 
    Mean Median  Std.dev  Mean Median  Std.dev 
CAPRATIO  Regulatory capital / 
Risk Weighted Assets 
10.6 10.1  2.7  10.4 9.9  2.7 
LIQUIDITY  Liquid Assets/Total 
Assets 
5.6 4.6  4.7  5.9 4.8  4.8 
INTERBANK  Interbank 
Borrowing/Total Assets 
17.1 15.7  12.9  18.7 12.4  16.7 
SECURITIZE  Cumulated 
Securitizations 2004-
2006 /Total Assets 
2.7 1.1  5.4  2.7 1.1  5.5 
CHARGEOFF  Loan Loss Provisions 
and Charge-offs/Total 
Loans at the beginning 
of the period 
0.31 0.26  0.22  0.31 0.28  0.19 
ROA  Profits/Total Assets  0.66 0.53  0.58  0.21 0.33  0.80 
BANKSIZE  Total Assets (billion 
euros) 
263.0 92.8  354.5  285.2 115.7  371.9 
MUTUAL B.    0.09     0.09    
Relationship Characteristics 
LOGCREDIT  Log of credit 
commitments from 
bank i to firm j  at the 
beginning of the period 
12.9 12.7  1.2  12.9 12.8  1.2 
SHARE  Share of commitments 
from bank i to firm j 
28.0 22.3  21.1  28.3 22.7  21.2 
DISTANCE  Equal to 1 if the bank 
has a branch in same 
postcode as the firm 
HQ 
0.41     0.33    
PASTDUE  Equal to 1 if firm j is 
past-due on loans from 
bank i at the beginning 
of the period. 
0.022     0.02     
    
N. of obs. credit commitments  629,085  654,165 
N. of obs. credit disbursed  526,359  555,640 
N. of obs. cost of credit  270,403  297,693 
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Table 7: Credit commitments (June-December 2007) 
     
VARIABLES  ΔCREDIT   ΔREVOLVING 
CREDIT LINES 
ΔDRAWDOWNS 
  (1) (2) (3) 
     
CAPRATIO -0.251  0.0111  -0.126 
  (0.155) (0.138) (0.274) 
LIQUIDITY 0.120*  0.121 0.192 
 (0.0627)  (0.137)  (0.129) 
INTERBANK -0.0668***  -0.00637  -0.0367 
  (0.0210) (0.0497) (0.0390) 
SECURITIZE -0.283***  -0.178**  -0.463*** 
  (0.0752) (0.0846) (0.0946) 
CHARGEOFF 0.696  11.73***  -1.473 
  (2.190) (3.183) (3.101) 
ROA  1.973 1.818 2.634 
  (1.249) (1.238) (2.002) 
BANKSIZE -0.206  -0.193  0.0438 
  (0.314) (0.332) (0.402) 
MUTUAL  BANK  0.852 1.272 2.339 
  (1.116) (1.074) (1.982) 
LOGCREDIT -0.455  -7.855***  -31.83*** 
  (0.661) (0.395) (0.865) 
SHARE -0.0445**  0.205***  1.240*** 
  (0.0198) (0.0115) (0.0396) 
DISTANCE -1.617***  -1.074**  -3.348*** 
  (0.586) (0.445) (1.035) 
PASTDUE -1.820**  -0.500  -7.423*** 
  (0.713) (0.974) (1.240) 
     
FIRM FIXED 
EFFECTS 
YES YES YES 
     
Observations  629085 512232 526359 
R-squared  0.468 0.419 0.463 
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 Table 8: Credit commitments (June-December 2007) 
Small and riskier borrowers 
VARIABLES  ΔCREDIT   ΔCREDIT   ΔCREDIT   ΔCREDIT  
FIRM DUMMY:  High Risk  Small  High Leverage  Low Profits 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
        
CAPRATIO -0.283*  -0.266  -0.262  -0.273* 
 (0.168)  (0.167)  (0.164)  (0.156) 
LIQUIDITY 0.131**  0.111*  0.107*  0.127** 
 (0.0613)  (0.0663)  (0.0640)  (0.0634) 
INTERBANK -0.0663***  -0.0642***  -0.0661***  -0.0624*** 
 (0.0194)  (0.0217)  (0.0204)  (0.0212) 
SECURITIZE -0.280***  -0.282***  -0.279***  -0.282*** 
 (0.0749)  (0.0752)  (0.0742)  (0.0745) 
CHARGEOFF 0.694  0.696  0.675  0.716 
 (2.158)  (2.153)  (2.147)  (2.148) 
ROA 1.952  1.988  2.018  1.973 
 (1.249)  (1.249)  (1.250)  (1.239) 
BANKSIZE -0.206  -0.204  -0.185  -0.207 
 (0.312)  (0.314)  (0.310)  (0.311) 
MUTUAL BANK  0.768  0.799  0.819  0.799 
 (1.106)  (1.113)  (1.118)  (1.109) 
LOGCREDIT -0.396  -0.413  -0.359  -0.425 
 (0.668)  (0.669)  (0.677)  (0.670) 
SHARE -0.0489**  -0.0485**  -0.0558***  -0.0470** 
 (0.0199)  (0.0201)  (0.0208)  (0.0202) 
DISTANCE -1.651***  -1.587***  -1.623***  -1.614*** 
 (0.584)  (0.579)  (0.585)  (0.577) 
PASTDUE -1.752**  -1.865**  -2.004***  -1.781** 
 (0.771)  (0.786)  (0.715)  (0.756) 
FIRMDUMMY*CAPRATIO 0.115 0.139 0.0563 0.113 
 (0.101)  (0.130)  (0.0870)  (0.0978) 
FIRMDUMMY*LIQUIDITY -0.0321 0.0478  0.0730  -0.0338 
 (0.0541)  (0.0563)  (0.0454)  (0.0558) 
FIRMDUMMY*INTERBANK -0.00106  -0.0249  0.00552  -0.0189 
 (0.0260)  (0.0176)  (0.0141)  (0.0184) 
        
FIRM FIXED EFFECTS  YES  YES  YES  YES 
        
Observations 603398  606363  592357  610619 
R-squared 0.464  0.465  0.458  0.465 
        
 





   41
 
Table 9: Cost of Credit (June-December 2007) Baseline and Small and Riskier borrowers 
 
  ΔRATE  ΔRATE  ΔRATE  ΔRATE  ΔRATE 
   High  Risk  Small  High 
Leverage 
Low Profits 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
          
CAPRATIO 0.0581  0.0741  0.0564  0.0746  0.0666 
 (0.0731)  (0.0764)  (0.0762)  (0.0780)  (0.0755) 
LIQUIDITY 0.0200  0.0176  0.0165  0.0200  0.0158 
 (0.0292)  (0.0279)  (0.0309)  (0.0290)  (0.0302) 
INTERBANK 0.0137*  0.0167**  0.0141*  0.0169*  0.0138* 
 (0.00815)  (0.00807)  (0.00840)  (0.00892)  (0.00818) 
SECURITIZE 0.0959***  0.0978***  0.0978***  0.0992***  0.0972*** 
 (0.0254)  (0.0256)  (0.0255)  (0.0258)  (0.0254) 
CHARGEOFF 0.807  0.843*  0.853*  0.897*  0.846* 
 (0.503)  (0.505)  (0.504)  (0.509)  (0.507) 
ROA -0.776  -0.764  -0.761  -0.787  -0.768 
 (0.553)  (0.550)  (0.549)  (0.563)  (0.551) 
BANKSIZE 0.122  0.121  0.118  0.126  0.119 
 (0.117)  (0.117)  (0.117)  (0.119)  (0.117) 
MUTUAL BANK  -0.0126  -0.00729  -0.0315  -0.0156  -0.0160 
 (0.322)  (0.324)  (0.323)  (0.324)  (0.323) 
RATE -0.328***  -0.328***  -0.328***  -0.328***  -0.328*** 
 (0.00700)  (0.00696)  (0.00707)  (0.00726)  (0.00706) 
LOGCREDIT 0.0363  0.0373  0.0396  0.0381  0.0400 
 (0.0236)  (0.0245)  (0.0245)  (0.0238)  (0.0243) 
SHARE -0.00239  -0.00270*  -0.00291*  -0.00307*  -0.00270 
 (0.00166)  (0.00162)  (0.00165)  (0.00164)  (0.00164) 
DISTANCE -0.221  -0.221  -0.219  -0.220  -0.220 
 (0.151)  (0.151)  (0.152)  (0.156)  (0.152) 
PASTDUE 0.193  0.154  0.169  0.219*  0.178 
 (0.123)  (0.127)  (0.125)  (0.116)  (0.127) 
FIRMDUMMY*CAPRA.  -0.0405  0.00811  -0.0440  -0.0317 
   (0.0317)  (0.0409)  (0.0359)  (0.0229) 
FIRMDUMMY*LIQ.   0.00552  0.0279  -0.00214  0.0168 
   (0.0205)  (0.0227)  (0.0191)  (0.0123) 
FIRMDUMMY*INTERB.  -0.00803*  -0.00640  -0.0120  -0.00150 
   (0.00441)  (0.00675)  (0.00892)  (0.00470) 
          
FIRM FIXED EFFECTS  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
          
Observations 270403  261065  262294  244556  263272 
R-squared 0.533  0.531  0.531  0.529  0.532 
          
Standard errors clustered at the bank level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
 




Table 10: Credit commitments (June-December 2008)  
     
VARIABLES  ΔCREDIT   ΔREVOLVING 
CREDIT LINES 
ΔDRAWDOWNS 
  (1) (2) (3) 
     
CAPRATIO  0.0579 0.151 0.0948 
  (0.149) (0.189) (0.274) 
LIQUIDITY 0.0962  -0.0464  0.173 
 (0.0799)  (0.117)  (0.138) 
INTERBANK -0.0713** 0.0728  -0.0171 
  (0.0289) (0.0456) (0.0501) 
SECURITIZE -0.0419  0.00920 -0.144 
 (0.0839)  (0.139)  (0.141) 
CHARGEOFF -1.142  -9.074***  -1.799 
  (2.108) (3.240) (3.504) 
ROA 3.009***  -3.062  4.405*** 
  (0.444) (2.166) (0.868) 
BANKSIZE -0.419*  -0.902**  -0.599 
  (0.216) (0.401) (0.426) 
MUTUAL  BANK  0.382 0.0709 1.069 
  (0.822) (1.490) (1.618) 
LOGCREDIT 0.0420  -12.24***  -31.64*** 
  (0.556) (1.967) (0.876) 
SHARE -0.0250*  0.260***  1.244*** 
  (0.0140) (0.0221) (0.0371) 
DISTANCE -2.727***  -1.995***  -3.682*** 
  (0.521) (0.684) (1.027) 
PASTDUE -2.204***  -1.425**  -5.845*** 
  (0.590) (0.652) (1.800) 
     
FIRM FIXED 
EFFECTS 
YES YES YES 
     
Observations  654165 528979 555640 
R-squared  0.371 0.349 0.451 
     













Table 11: Credit Commitments (June-December 2008) 
Small and riskier borrowers 
  
VARIABLES  ΔCREDIT   ΔCREDIT   ΔCREDIT   ΔCREDIT  
FIRM DUMMY:  High Risk  Small  High Leverage  Low Profits 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
        
CAPRATIO 0.0579  0.0581  0.0537  0.0669 
 (0.154)  (0.161)  (0.172)  (0.156) 
LIQUIDITY 0.102  0.0937  0.118  0.104 
 (0.0797)  (0.0842)  (0.0822)  (0.0809) 
INTERBANK -0.0727**  -0.0704**  -0.0744**  -0.0707** 
 (0.0296)  (0.0301)  (0.0301)  (0.0301) 
SECURITIZE -0.0416  -0.0405  -0.0397  -0.0418 
 (0.0851)  (0.0851)  (0.0860)  (0.0850) 
CHARGEOFF -1.269  -1.288  -1.216  -1.328 
 (2.133)  (2.132)  (2.151)  (2.121) 
ROA 3.074***  3.070***  3.137***  3.039*** 
 (0.444)  (0.445)  (0.450)  (0.444) 
BANKSIZE -0.416*  -0.413*  -0.412*  -0.416* 
 (0.220)  (0.219)  (0.219)  (0.218) 
MUTUAL BANK  0.335  0.267  0.291  0.342 
 (0.828)  (0.824)  (0.817)  (0.828) 
LOGCREDIT 0.115  0.112  0.171  0.132 
 (0.558)  (0.559)  (0.554)  (0.555) 
SHARE -0.0313**  -0.0310**  -0.0401***  -0.0307** 
 (0.0146)  (0.0143)  (0.0144)  (0.0147) 
DISTANCE -2.692***  -2.716***  -2.749***  -2.670*** 
 (0.516)  (0.516)  (0.526)  (0.507) 
PASTDUE -2.209***  -2.213***  -2.349***  -2.211*** 
 (0.640)  (0.608)  (0.653)  (0.626) 
FIRMDUMMY*CAPRATIO 0.0435 0.0354 0.0353 -0.0145 
 (0.145)  (0.116)  (0.0713)  (0.0771) 
FIRMDUMMY*LIQUIDITY -0.106 0.0123 -0.0395 -0.0381 
 (0.0960)  (0.0669)  (0.0535)  (0.0417) 
FIRMDUMMY*INTERBANK 0.00291  -0.0270  0.00383  -0.0105 
 (0.0245)  (0.0201)  (0.0129)  (0.0117) 
        
FIRM FIXED EFFECTS  YES  YES  YES  YES 
        
Observations        
R-squared 626719  629272  612515  617579 
        
Standard errors clustered at the bank level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table 12: Cost of Credit (June-December 2008) Baseline and Small and Riskier borrowers 
  ΔRATE  ΔRATE  ΔRATE  ΔRATE  ΔRATE 
   High  Risk  Small  High 
Leverage 
Low Profits 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
          
CAPRATIO 0.135  0.143  0.157  0.178*  0.137 
 (0.0916)  (0.0927)  (0.0980)  (0.0980)  (0.0933) 
LIQUIDITY -0.0234  -0.0243  -0.0277  -0.0393  -0.0228 
 (0.0336)  (0.0337)  (0.0351)  (0.0337)  (0.0343) 
INTERBANK 0.000245  8.91e-05  0.00133  0.00225  -0.000683 
 (0.0116)  (0.0117)  (0.0119)  (0.0117)  (0.0121) 
SECURITIZE 0.0634**  0.0642**  0.0647**  0.0653**  0.0649** 
 (0.0253)  (0.0254)  (0.0252)  (0.0258)  (0.0258) 
CHARGEOFF 2.009***  2.010***  2.009***  1.986***  1.982*** 
 (0.728)  (0.713)  (0.708)  (0.726)  (0.724) 
ROA 0.667  0.684  0.692  0.678  0.685 
 (0.470)  (0.467)  (0.462)  (0.474)  (0.471) 
BANKSIZE 0.142**  0.143**  0.143**  0.151**  0.147** 
 (0.0627)  (0.0629)  (0.0625)  (0.0642)  (0.0636) 
MUTUAL BANK  -0.239  -0.257  -0.266  -0.277  -0.239 
 (0.388)  (0.390)  (0.392)  (0.397)  (0.392) 
RATE -0.309***  -0.310***  -0.310***  -0.310***  -0.310*** 
 (0.00775)  (0.00773)  (0.00773)  (0.00775)  (0.00780) 
LOGCREDIT -0.0365  -0.0359  -0.0361  -0.0414  -0.0407 
 (0.0508)  (0.0544)  (0.0542)  (0.0532)  (0.0543) 
SHARE -0.000468  -0.000638  -0.000670  -0.000481  -0.000512 
 (0.00173)  (0.00195)  (0.00190)  (0.00196)  (0.00190) 
DISTANCE 0.0735  0.0816  0.0755  0.0909  0.0902 
 (0.116)  (0.114)  (0.113)  (0.117)  (0.117) 
PASTDUE 0.191*  0.208*  0.177  0.171  0.191* 
 (0.105)  (0.112)  (0.107)  (0.108)  (0.106) 
FIRMDUMMY*CAPRAT. -  -0.0856**  -0.168**  -0.0570  0.00416 
 -  (0.0385)  (0.0644)  (0.0414)  (0.0265) 
FIRMDUMMY*LIQ. -  0.0245*  0.0416**  0.0259  -0.00132 
 -  (0.0139)  (0.0210)  (0.0178)  (0.0115) 
FIRMDUMMY*INTERB. -  -0.00349  -0.0133**  -0.00454  0.00112 
 -  (0.00309)  (0.00665)  (0.00493)  (0.00250) 
          
FIRM FIXED EFFECTS  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
          
Observations 297693  286774  287944  268960  282120 
R-squared 0.517  0.516  0.516  0.515  0.516 
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Table 13: Interactions among capital, liquidity, reliance on interbank funding (June-
December 2007) 
  ΔCREDIT  ΔCREDIT  ΔCREDIT  ΔCREDIT  ΔCREDIT     ΔCREDIT 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)          (6) 
         
CAPRATIO -0.167  -0.164*  -0.323**  -0.268*  -0.140  -0.214 
 (0.214)  (0.0929)  (0.144)  (0.156) (0.141) (0.155) 
LIQUIDITY 0.202*  0.114*  0.146**  0.123**  0.133**  -0.0242 
 (0.105)  (0.0601)  (0.0593)  (0.0618) (0.0619) (0.0844) 
INTERBANK -0.0663***  0.138  -0.0609*** -0.0643***  -0.0597*** -0.146*** 
 (0.0212)  (0.221)  (0.0195)  (0.0194) (0.0199) (0.0393) 
SECURITIZE -0.281***  -0.278***  -1.552*** -0.277*** -0.235*** -0.276*** 
 (0.0756)  (0.0775)  (0.340)  (0.0745) (0.0623) (0.0680) 
CHARGEOFF 0.667  0.352  3.360*  -0.314  0.502  0.378 
 (2.175)  (2.287)  (1.892)  (3.388) (2.058) (1.922) 
ROA  1.827  2.608** 0.0745  1.902 6.251*** 1.371 
 (1.195)  (1.075)  (1.172)  (1.234) (2.294) (1.067) 
CAPRATIO*LIQUID.  -0.00607       
  (0.00595)       
CAPRATIO*INTERB.    -0.0208      
    (0.0226)      
CAPRATIO*SECURIT.    0.128***     
     (0.0318)     
CAPRATIO*CHARG.       0.0567     
       (0.0814)     
CAPRATIO*ROA       -0.431*   
       (0.253)   
LIQUIDITY*INTERB.        0.0160** 
        (0.00744) 
BANKSIZE  -0.172 -0.274  0.00121  -0.187 -0.182 -0.217 
 (0.318)  (0.321)  (0.220)  (0.325) (0.313) (0.291) 
MUTUAL  BANK  0.920 0.391 1.314 0.911 1.499 1.493 
 (1.100)  (0.922)  (0.988)  (1.117) (1.137) (0.992) 
LOGCREDIT  -0.455 -0.475 -0.637 -0.464 -0.606 -0.475 
 (0.663)  (0.620)  (0.588)  (0.655) (0.547) (0.665) 
SHARE  -0.0445** -0.0439** -0.0376** -0.0442** -0.0395** -0.0440** 
 (0.0198)  (0.0185)  (0.0179)  (0.0197) (0.0168) (0.0198) 
DISTANCE -1.651***  -1.493***  -1.800*** -1.652*** -1.531*** -1.688*** 
 (0.575)  (0.475)  (0.526)  (0.602) (0.488) (0.560) 
PASTDUE  -1.820**  -1.768** -1.984*** -1.825** -1.868*** -1.775** 
 (0.717)  (0.701)  (0.684)  (0.715) (0.719) (0.700) 
        
FIRM FIXED 
EFFECTS 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        
Observations  629085 629085 629085 629085 629085 629085 
R-squared  0.468 0.468 0.469 0.468 0.469 0.468 
        
Standard errors clustered at the bank level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
   46
Table 14: Interactions among capital, liquidity, reliance on interbank funding (June-
December 2008) 
  ΔCREDIT  ΔCREDIT  ΔCREDIT  ΔCREDIT  ΔCREDIT     ΔCREDIT
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)          (6) 
            
CAPRATIO 0.119  0.137  0.000882  -0.0353  0.0283  0.0835 
 (0.235)  (0.0901)  (0.131)  (0.153)  (0.148)  (0.143) 
LIQUIDITY 0.142  0.0859  0.114  0.108  0.108  0.00634 
 (0.123)  (0.0789)  (0.0729)  (0.0769)  (0.0775)  (0.0837) 
INTERBANK -0.0727**  0.125  -0.0617**  -0.0763***  -0.0754*** -0.107** 
 (0.0282)  (0.200)  (0.0304)  (0.0291)  (0.0286)  (0.0436) 
SECURITIZE  -0.0382 -0.0466 -1.358** -0.0260 -0.0268  -0.0499 
 (0.0856)  (0.0884)  (0.535)  (0.0845)  (0.0837)  (0.0842) 
CHARGEOFF  -1.229  -0.839 -1.063 -3.178  -1.695  -0.662 
 (2.139)  (2.329)  (1.902)  (2.523)  (2.079)  (2.280) 
ROA 2.990***  3.104***  2.508***  3.060***  4.165***  2.881*** 
 (0.431)  (0.383)  (0.481)  (0.432)  (0.579)  (0.462) 
CAPRATIO*LIQUID -0.00350           
 (0.00649)           
CAPRATIO*INTERB   -0.0207         
   (0.0213)         
CAPRATIO*SECURIT     0.133**       
     (0.0544)       
CAPRATIO*CHARG.       0.121**     
       (0.0545)     
CAPRATIO*ROA         -0.118**   
         (0.0562)   
LIQUIDITY*INTERB.          0.00563 
           (0.00465) 
BANKSIZE -0.401*  -0.424**  -0.456**  -0.387*  -0.392*  -0.469** 
 (0.222)  (0.215)  (0.212)  (0.218)  (0.214)  (0.223) 
MUTUAL BANK  0.328  0.280  -0.337  0.579  0.652  0.686 
 (0.852)  (0.802)  (0.780)  (0.826)  (0.856)  (0.848) 
LOGCREDIT 0.0437  0.00545  0.0165  0.0390  0.0206  0.0345 
 (0.557)  (0.521)  (0.548)  (0.554)  (0.543)  (0.554) 
SHARE  -0.0252*  -0.0240* -0.0237* -0.0248*  -0.0242*  -0.0249* 
 (0.0140)  (0.0128)  (0.0139)  (0.0139)  (0.0136)  (0.0139) 
DISTANCE  -2.735***  -2.570*** -2.735*** -2.693***  -2.680***  -2.654*** 
 (0.515)  (0.389)  (0.492)  (0.516)  (0.497)  (0.509) 
PASTDUE  -2.201***  -2.209*** -2.197*** -2.199***  -2.196***  -2.184*** 
 (0.591)  (0.579)  (0.591)  (0.587)  (0.588)  (0.585) 
            
FIRM FIXED 
EFFECTS 
YES  YES YES YES  YES  YES 
            
Observations 654165  654165  654165  654165  654165  654165 
R-squared 0.371  0.371  0.371  0.371  0.371  0.371 
            
Standard errors clustered at the bank level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 





Table 15: Credit Commitments for Continuing Relationship and Relationship Dynamics  
 
 2007  2008 
  ΔCREDIT Pr(cut=1)  Pr(accept=1) ΔCREDIT Pr(cut=1)  Pr(accept=1)
VARIABLES  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
          
CAPRATIO -0.174  0.0742  -0.140  0.0101  -0.0469  0.0582 
 (0.112)  (0.0668)  (0.148)  (0.102)  (0.0616)  (0.124) 
LIQUIDITY 0.109**  -0.0230  0.171  0.0865*  -0.0166  0.369** 
  (0.0516)  (0.0278) (0.151) (0.0515)  (0.0418)  (0.163) 
INTERBANK -0.0357***  0.0293** -0.138*** -0.0309 0.0416***  -0.0733 
 (0.0133)  (0.0141)  (0.0516)  (0.0196) (0.0147)  (0.0664) 
SECURITIZE -0.157***  0.138*** 0.00992 -0.00346  0.0340  0.0992 
 (0.0391)  (0.0475)  (0.0794)  (0.0537) (0.0473) (0.112) 
CHARGEOFF 1.141  0.441  3.081 -0.00887 1.104  -1.371 
 (1.304)  (1.139)  (2.649)  (1.342) (1.020)  (2.518) 
ROA 1.937**  -0.153  2.510  1.902***  -1.313***  1.447*** 
 (0.817)  (0.645)  (1.824)  (0.336) (0.196)  (0.502) 
BANKSIZE 0.0466  0.187  -0.306  -0.269*  0.105  -0.373 
 (0.164)  (0.189)  (0.516)  (0.142) (0.115)  (0.485) 
MUTUAL  BANK  0.728  -0.209 2.869 0.280 -0.120  -2.634 
 (0.809)  (0.540)  (1.905)  (0.607) (0.388)  (1.601) 
LOGCREDIT -6.082***  -4.023***  -  -5.325***  -4.234***  - 
 (0.611)  (0.292)  -  (0.573)  (0.186)  - 
SHARE -0.00564  0.00585  -  -0.00949  -0.0116  - 
 (0.0215)  (0.00769)  -  (0.0152)  (0.00747)  - 
DISTANCE -1.246***  0.489*  -  -1.590***  1.239***  - 
 (0.402)  (0.261)  -  (0.369)  (0.240)  - 
PASTDUE -0.174  0.0742 - 0.188  2.059***  - 
 (0.112)  (0.0668)  -  (0.396)  (0.536)  - 
          
FIRM FIXED 
EFFECTS 
YES  YES YES YES YES  YES 
          
Observations  568711  629085 290575 603738 654165  320302 
R-squared  0.330  0.656 0.643 0.334 0.437  0.660 
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